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THE MEASUREMENT OF SCOPE, SCALE AND 
DIVERSIFICATION ECONOMIES: 
HOW (IN)EFFICIENT IS ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING AND UNBUNDLING?a 
 
Pablo Arocenab  
 
ABSTRACT: This paper estimates the degree of economies of scope, diversification 
and scale in the Spanish electricity industry by means of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Our results show that there exist economies of integrating power generation and 
distribution, as well as economies of product diversification at the generation stage. 
Particularly, the hypothetical vertical unbundling and the generating product 
specialization of the existing diversified firms would raise the total operating costs of 
the Spanish electricity sector by 4.7 and 3.5 percent respectively. Additionally, size 
appears to be irrelevant provided that vertical scope and product-mix are preserved. 
Further, it is estimated that overall operating costs of the sector could be reduced by 
2.7% by partitioning each of the diversified firms down the middle. In addition to 
improving firms’ scale efficiency, such fragmentation would help to create a more 
competitive market structure.  
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RESUMEN: En este trabajo se estiman economías de alcance, diversificación y escala 
en el sector eléctrico español mediante Data Envelopment Análisis. Los resultados 
muestran que existen economías derivadas de la integración de las fases de generación y 
distribución de electricidad, así como economías asociadas a la diversificación entre 
productos de generación. En particular, una hipotética separación vertical de las 
empresas analizadas y una mayor especialización en la fase de generación elevarían los 
costes de operación en un 4,7% y en un 3,5% respectivamente. Asimismo, el tamaño de 
la empresa no es un factor importante siempre que se mantenga el grado de integración 
vertical y diversificación horizontal. En este sentido, se ha estimado que un 
fraccionamiento por la mitad de las empresas analizadas, además de contribuir a crear 
una estructura de mercado más competitiva, mejoraría la eficiencia de escala y 
originaría un ahorro del 2,7% de los costes de explotación. 
 
Palabras clave: Economías de alcance, diversificación, eficiencia de escala, 
electricidad, DEA. 
Clasificación JEL: D24, L94, L11. 
                                                          
a Comments are welcome. The opinions expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect the IEB's 
opinions. 
 
b Corresponding address: pablo@unavarra.es 
Dpto. Gestión de Empresas 
Campus de Arrosadia  
Universidad Pública de Navarra.  
31006 Pamplona (Spain) 
Tel. +34 948169684  /  Fax. +34 948169404  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The worldwide wave of liberalising reforms in the electricity industry have been aimed 
at introducing competition in a sector traditionally organised around monopoly, public 
ownership and intense regulation. However, the pro-competitive potential of these 
reforms is fundamentally determined by the market structure. Thus, as in any other 
industry, the existence of a sufficient number of competitors is an indispensable 
requisite for developing an effective competition. Further, in the electricity sector the 
effective separation between regulated and non-regulated business is essential to attain 
the benefits of competition1.  
 
In some countries these reforms failed to sufficiently restructure their electricity 
industries and the result has been the creation of power pools where major incumbents 
enjoy substantial market power. In others the industry at liberalisation was mostly 
comprised of a small number of vertically integrated private firms, so that the chances 
for restructuring through privatisation were more limited. Thus, in Spain the high level 
of horizontal concentration together with firms’ vertical integration are considered the 
main obstacles for the competitive functioning of the electricity market eight years after 
market liberalisation (Arocena et al 1999, Kühn y Machado, 2004, Fernández-Ordóñez 
2002, Ocaña 2003). 
 
Some governments decided to intervene once liberalisation and privatisation had 
occurred with the aim of mitigating incumbents’ market power, basically by promoting 
the partition of large firms in smaller units and thus increasing the number of 
competitors. Thus, the British electricity regulator required the two major generators 
successive plant divestments in order to improve the efficiency of the wholesale power 
market (OFFER 1994, 1998). 2 In the same vein, in California financial incentives were 
introduced (higher allowed rate of return) to induce divestiture of 50% of the fossil-fuel 
                                                          
1 Otherwise, a vertically integrated company would be able of (i) cross-subsidizing the competitive part of 
the business with profits from the regulated business; (ii) distorting competition by favouring their 
associated business over competitors, whether in quality of service or in the price charged for using the 
system. The threat of such anticompetitive behaviour is an effective entry deterrent. A third reason to 
introduce unbundling is to improve the effectiveness of regulation. 
 
2 Although the amount of divestiture was substantial, it was insufficient to ensure a competitive pool in 
England and Wales (Day and Bunn, 2001). 
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generation assets owned by the largest utilities. Likewise, the European Commission 
has followed the same strategy in its recent decisions on mergers. Thus, it authorised the 
acquisition of German electricity company EnBW by Electricité de France (EDF) 
subject to the divestment of 6,000 Megawatts of generation capacity located in France 
(EC, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, the (technically) efficient number of firms as well as their degree of 
vertical integration depends on the magnitude of the economies of scale and scope 
economies. Hence, if scale and horizontal diversification economies are limited or 
negligible, the break-up of large firms in smaller units will have a positive effect on 
reducing market power without damaging the costs of the resulting firms. On the 
contrary, if such economies are significant, the partition will lead to efficiency losses 
(and cost increases) that could counterweight the potential benefits derived from a more 
competitive functioning of the market. 
 
A similar argument applies to the vertical scope of the firm. If power could be 
efficiently supplied by means of specialized firms competing in their respective stages 
of the business, vertical separation could help to increase the competitive pressure in the 
market without cost penalties. Conversely, if vertical or scope economies across stages 
are important, potential benefits of unbundling could be counterbalanced by the loss of 
productive efficiency. 
 
Defenders of large firms and vertical integration remark the existence of economies of 
scope and scale economies, while advocates of unbundling cite the benefits of 
competition and deregulation. Therefore, the estimation of such economies has 
important policy implications on further restructuring (or not) (Pittman, 2003). 
However, while a great deal of attention has been paid to the competitive effects of 
restructuring policies, the analysis of the potential costs in terms of productive 
efficiency losses has devoted considerable less attention. Nevertheless, the available 
empirical work suggests that vertical economies across generation and 
transmission/distribution stages, as well as scale and horizontal diversification 
economies at generation and distribution stages might be significant (Kaserman and 
Mayo 1991, Gilsdorf 1995, Lee 1995, Thompson 1997, Hayashi et al 1997, Kwoka 
2002, Nemoto and Goto 2004, Jara-Díaz et al 2004).  
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The objective of this paper is the estimation of these economies in the Spanish 
electricity sector by means of an alternative approach. Particularly, we use non-
parametric methods based on linear programming models (Data Envelopment 
Analysis). This approach presents some attractive features over the traditional cost 
function estimation. First, it implies the estimation of a frontier rather than the non-
frontier cost function, which implies to implicitly assume that firms are efficient. 
Second, we do not impose a priori any functional form relative to the underlying 
technology (i.e. quadratic, translog, etc.). Finally, specific benchmark frontiers are 
constructed for diversified and specialized utilities. This avoids a general assumption of 
parametric approaches:  the definition and estimation of identical forms of cost 
functions regardless of whether outputs are jointly produced or separately produced. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical background of 
scope and scale economies. Section 3 describes the non-parametric frontier 
methodology we use to estimate the economies of integration. Section 4 presents data 
and variables while results are displayed in Section 5. Final section summarizes the 
empirical results and makes conclusions.  
 
2. Economies of scope, diversification and scale: Theoretical background. 
 
Firm boundaries and, consequently, the configuration of the industry, is largely 
determined by the properties of the firms’ cost function. In this respect, the notion of 
cost subadditivity is particularly relevant. A cost function C(y) is said to be subadditive 
at the output level y if for any and all quantities of outputs y1,…yn, yj≠ y, j = 1,…,n, such 
that yy
i
i =∑ , we have ( ) ( )yCyC i >∑ . That is, if the cost function is subadditive, it is 
more cost efficient to combine the output bundles produced by several firms into a 
single bundle to be produced by one larger firm. Further, if the firms’ cost function is 
subadditive over the entire relevant range of outputs, then the industry is said to be a 
natural monopoly since a single firm can produce all relevant output vectors more 
cheaply than two or more firms. Alternatively, if the cost function were superadditive it 
would be cost efficient to break up the output of a large firm into several bundles to be 
produced by a number of smaller firms.  
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Cost subadditivity shapes both the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm. Thus, 
it is related to the degree of (i) economies of scale; (ii) vertical (or multistage) 
economies of scope across stages; and (iii) horizontal (or product-mix) economies at 
one stage. 
 
2.1 Multistage scope economies:  Vertical integration. 
 
Economies of scope arise from cost savings obtained from joint production. That is, it is 
more efficient to produce an output bundle by a single diversified firm than splitting up 
the production of each output, or subset of outputs, between separate specialised firms. 
Following Baumol et al (1982 p.71-72), let N be the set of outputs produced by a firm. 
Consider a subset of the firm’s outputs NS ⊆ . Let { }kTTTP ,...,, 21=  be a non-trivial 
partition of S. That is, 1  ,0  .    0  >≠≠=∩=∪ kTjiparaTTS,T ijiii . There are 
economies of scope at sy with respect to the partition P if ( ) ( )sk
i
Ti ycyc >∑
=1
. 
Diseconomies of scope occur if the inequality is reversed. Economies of scope is a 
necessary –though no sufficient- condition for subadditivity.  
Thus, for the two-output case (y1,y2) there are economies of scope if 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2121 ,00,, yCyCyyC +<  [1] 
 
When y1 and y2 are outputs corresponding to adjacent stages in the vertical chain (i.e. 
generation and distribution of electricity), [1] reveals the existence of vertical (or 
multistage) scope economies (Kaserman and Mayo, 1991). 
Note that economies of scope is a restricted form of subadditivity, where the output 
vectors of specialized firms are restricted to be orthogonal to one another, that is, such 
that yi · yj = 0, i≠j. Thus, for the three-output case ( )321 ,, yyyy = , economies of scope 
are said to exist with respect to partition { }21 ,TTP = , T1 = (y1,0,0),  T2 = (0, y2, y3) if 3 
 
( ) ( ) ( )321321 ,,,,00,0, yyycyycyc >+  
                                                          
3 This is only one possible partition of the output vector. Scope economies could be calculated relative to 
any non-trivial partition. For example, P’ = (T1, T2, T3) where T1 = (y1, 0, 0), T2 = (0, y2, 0), T3 = (0, 0, 
y3), which would imply full specialization. 
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The degree of scope economies at y relative to the partition P is defined as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )yC
yCyCyCySC TNTP
−+= −  [2] 
 
That is, it measures the relative increase in cost that would result from dividing the 
production of y into product lines T and N-T. Such a fragmentation of the firm increases, 
decreases, or leaves unchanged the total cost, as SC(y) is greater than, less than, or equal 
to zero, respectively.  
 
2.2 Economies of horizontal diversification or product-mix economies. 
 
Grosskopf et al (1992) define economies of diversification as the cost savings that may 
result from a firm’s increasing the number of simultaneously produced (different) 
outputs. Consider the three-output case and two firms (A,B). Additionally, let us assume 
that outputs 1 and 2 are produced in the upstream stage (i.e. hydroelectric and thermal 
power generation) while output 3 is the downstream product (i.e. power distribution). 
Firm A specializes in the production of output 1, firm B specializes in the production 2, 
while both firms produce some of output 3. That is, both firms are vertically integrated 
but are specialized in the upstream stage. Economies of horizontal diversification are 
said to exist if 
 
( ) ( ) ( )BABABBAA yyyycyycyyc 33213231 ,,,,0,0, +>+  
 
Diseconomies of diversification occur if the inequality is reversed. For the three-output 
case, the degree of economies of diversification can be measured as  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )BABA
BABABBAA
yyyyc
yyyycyycyycyDIV
3321
33213231
,,
,,,,0,0,
+
+−+=  [3] 
 
If DIV(y) is positive (negative) then economies (diseconomies) of diversification exist at 
y. If DIV is zero, costs are additive at y. DIV(y) compares the costs of two vertically 
integrated firms each producing some unique output to the cost of a single multiproduct 
firm which produces all of the products at the same levels of total output. 
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It is therefore, an appropriate measure to evaluate decisions on expansion of product 
line, as well as to assess the cost consequences of merging (breaking up) power firms 
with diverse generation mix. 
 
2.3 Multiproduct Scale Economies 
 
Multiproduct scale economies are said to exist when total costs go up less than 
proportionally when the output of all products is increased by the same proportion. This 
is equivalent to decreasing ray average cost. Ray average cost is the multiproduct 
equivalent of average cost as defined for the single-product firm, and is defined as the 
average cost of producing the fixed bundle for a given scale of production.  That is, the 
measure of total output when there are N products is done by fixing a bundle of the N 
products and the measure of output is then the number of bundles produced. This is 
equivalent to assuming that output is produced in fixed proportions and the measure of 
output is then the scale of production. The degree of multiproduct scale economies is 
given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
)(
)(
yC
yCyvCyvC
yMSE
B
i
A
i −+=   [4] 
 
where vi denotes output proportions, with 1>vi>0 and ∑ =
i
iv 1. MSE(y) >1 (<1) implies 
multiproduct economies (diseconomies) of scale. When RAC is decreasing at y, it is not 
possible splitting up the output bundle y, holding the mix of products constant, without 
increasing total cost4. 
 
Figure 1 depicts total cost and average cost along the ray OR, which keeps constant the 
proportion in which product 1 and product 2 are produced (y2/y1).  RAC reaches its 
minimum at the output y = yo at which the ray OT is tangent to the total cost surface in 
the hyperplane erected on OR. Any output vector to the left or right of yo presents higher 
average costs along OR. Putting in other words, only yo is scale efficient in OR, it is the 
optimal scale of production for such output proportion (y2/y1). For example, the partition 
                                                          
4 Decreasing ray average costs up to y imply ray subadditivity at y (Baumol et al, 1982 p.175). 
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of a single firm producing y0 in two identical firms by dividing yo down the middle (i.e. 
v = 0.5 resulting in two firms producing yo/2) along OR, will increase RAC due to the 
scale inefficiency.  
 
Figure 1. Ray average cost and scale efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Most empirical analysis on scope, scale and product-mix economies typically relies on 
the estimation of multiproduct cost functions. Ramos-Real (2005) provides a recent and 
comprehensive review of this approach in the electricity industry. Nevertheless, there 
have been various adaptations of the DEA methodology to estimate the efficiency of 
joint production and diversification versus especialization (Färe, 1986; Färe et al, 1994). 
Particularly, this approach has been applied to the estimation of scope and 
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diversification economies in different contexts, such as municipalities (Grosskopf and 
Yaisawarng 1990), banks (Ferrier et al, 1993), hospitals (Prior, 1996; Fried et al, 1998, 
Prior and Solá 2000, Kittelsen and Magnussen, 2003) and cogeneration systems (Kwon 
and Yun, 2003). 
 
Let ( ) MM Ryyy +∈= ,....,1  be the output vector produced by means of the input 
vector ( ) NN Rxxx +∈= ,.....,1 . Production technology can be represented by the input 
requirement set, which includes all input vectors yielding output y. 
( ) { xxyL := produce }y . Technology can also be completely described by the cost 
function  
 
( ) ( ){ }yLxwxwyC
x
∈= :min, , [5] 
 
where ( ) NN Rwww +∈= ,....,1  is the vector of input prices. The cost function describes the 
minimal costs to produce the corresponding combination of outputs with given input 
prices.  
 
Assume that there are two output bundles, named yA and yB, which can be either jointly 
or individually produced from the same inputs (x1,x2), by diversified or specialized 
firms respectively. Let L(yA,yB) denote the input combinations necessary to jointly 
produce yA and yB. In Figure 2 this input set is the area bounded from below by the 
isoquant Isoq-L(yA,yB). Therefore, Isoq-L(yA,yB) represents the frontier of technology of 
the diversified firms. Additionally, in Figure 2 two isocost lines are indicated given the 
input prices w = (w1,w2). The lower one represents minimal cost relative to L(yA,yB). 
 
Let us consider a diversified firm like F. This firm is inefficient because it could 
produce (yA,yB) with less consumption of both inputs (technical inefficiency), and 
consequently, with lower total costs. The overall economic inefficiency of firm F can be 
represented by the distance to the isocost line CdCd' . Thus, the ratio OFOFd /
*  measures 
the reduction in costs attainable by firm F once both technical and allocative 
inefficiency are eliminated.  
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Figure 2. Efficiency gains from joint versus separate production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the isoquant labelled by Isoq-L(yA)+L(yB) and the isocost line CSCS' 
represents the efficient frontier for separate production of yA and yB. It is an additive 
frontier constructed by summing the inputs quantities employed by the specialized firms 
in the production of output vectors yA and yB. In Figure 2 it is easy to see that the 
inefficiency of our diversified firm F is smaller relative to this additive frontier. This is 
measured by the distance OFOFS /
* , which is smaller than OFOFd /
* . Therefore, given 
input prices w, the minimum cost attainable from producing (yA, yB) in separate firms is 
higher than their joint production.  In other words, the cost of splitting up the production 
of (yA, yB) into specialized firms equals to the ratio **** // SdSd CCOFOF =  
 
The source of the (dis)economies behind this distance is given by the characteristics of 
the specialized vectors used in the construction of the additive frontier L(yA)+L(yB). For 
example, if output vectors yA and yB are orthogonal, the ratio ** / Sd OFOF accounts for 
(dis)economies of scope. Otherwise, it may account for (dis)economies of 
diversification as defined above. 
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In summary, we can estimate the efficiency gains due to integration by comparing the 
cost frontier of joint production C(yA,yB) with that corresponding to separate production 
C(yA)+ C(yB).  
 
Let Y be the matrix MxK of observed outputs and X the (NxK) matrix of observed 
inputs. That is, there are M different outputs and N different inputs for each of K firms. 
We construct a piecewise linear reference technology based on these observed outputs 
and inputs by taking convex combinations of the observed data points and their 
extensions  
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ =ℜ∈≤⋅≥⋅= ∑
=
+
K
k
k
K zzxzyzxyL
1
1,,,:)( XY  [6] 
 
where L(y) is the input requirement set for output vector y and z is a Kx1 vector of 
intensity variables from activity analysis. The restriction on the z variables implies that 
the technology represented by (6) allows for variable returns to scale.5 
The minimal costs for each diversified firm relative to their own technology may be 
calculated as the solution to the following linear programming problem for each 
observation k 
 
( )
∑
=
+
=
∈
≤
≥
=
K
k
k
K
d
k
d
d
k
z
d
k
d
k
d
z
Rz
czC
yYz
ts
cyE
1
1
.
min,
λ
λ
 [7] 
 
where superscript d stands for the sample of diversified firms. Hence, Cd is the 1xK 
vector of observed costs of the diversified firms and cdk is the scalar-valued cost for firm 
k. The value of Ed obtained is the efficiency score for the k-th diversified firm. It 
satisfies that Ed ≤ 1 with a value of 1 indicating an economically efficient firm. A value 
                                                          
5 See Färe et al. (1994) for a detailed analysis of the properties of this technology. 
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of Ed is then obtained for each firm, i.e. the problem [7] mast be solved K times, once 
for each firm in the sample. Similarly, we calculate the efficiency of the diversified firm 
relative to the additive frontier by solving 
 
( )
∑
=
+
=
∈
≤
≥
=
K
k
k
K
d
k
S
d
k
S
z
d
k
d
k
S
z
Rz
czC
yzY
ts
cyE
1
1
.
min,
λ
λ
 [8] 
 
where superscript s denotes the set of the additive combination of specialized firms. 
Thus, YS is the (MxK) output matrix and CS is the (1xK) vector of total cost, both 
referred to the additive data set. ES therefore measures the economic (in)efficiency of 
the diversified k-th firm in producing output vector yd relative to the minimum cost 
attainable by separate specialized firms. 
 
Finally, note that in our DEA model specification we assume that all firms face identical 
input prices. We consider this to be realistic assumption since all firms included in the 
analysis operate in a similar economic environment, i.e. the same country and a 
common regulatory regime6. 
 
 
4. Data and variables 
 
Our data set consists of production levels and costs of twelve Spanish electrical utilities 
throughout the period 1991-1997. These firms accounted for the totality of power 
generation and distribution in Spain over the period.  
                                                          
6 When it is believed that firms under consideration face different prices  (e.g. as in international 
comparisons), problem [7] can be  easily formulated as  
min wk´ xk 
s.t. 
Yz≥yk ; Xz≤ xk ; z∈ R+ where wk is a vector of input prices for the k-th firm 
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For the generation outputs, we consider the megawatts/hour of hydroelectric (HYDRO) 
and thermal power (THERMAL)7. Regarding distribution/supply, we include low 
voltage (LV) and high voltage (HV) power distribution, both measured in megawatts 
hour, as well as the total number of customers (CUSTO).8 Finally, net operating costs 
(that is, exclusive of purchased power) were measured at constant 1990 prices and 
calculated as the sum of fuel costs, personnel costs, depreciation and other external 
operating costs. Data were drawn from the National Energy Commission (CNE, 1997) 
and the annual reports of companies. Table 1 shows the output bundles and costs for 
each company over the period 1991-1997. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
As a first step, firms were classified in four groups, according to their degree of 
business specialization. 
 
Group 1. Generating firms only, that is, firms that do not distribute the power they 
produce, but resale to other firms. This group is formed by only one firm, ENDESA.  
 
Group 2. Firms specialized in power distribution, with some percentage of power 
generation, being that produced mostly by hydro facilities. This group is comprised of 
three companies: ERZ, ENHER and HEC. 
 
Group 3. Power generating and distributing companies with a clear thermal 
specialization: GESA, UNELCO and SEVILLANA. 
 
Group 4. Diversified firms with a vertical integration ratio (generated MWh/ 
Distributed MWh) above 75%. This group is comprised of five firms: IBERDROLA, 
UNIÓN FENOSA, HIDROCANTABRICO, VIESGO and FECSA.  
 
                                                          
7 HYDRO figures also includes power generated from wind turbines, while THERMAL covers power 
produced from fossil-fuelled stations –mostly coal based- and nuclear plants. 
 
8 In Spain, transmission -or high voltage transport- is carried out by a single firm, Red Eléctrica de 
España, which at the time considered in this study was a public monopoly. Nevertheless, various utilities 
retained some transmission lines which were accounted into their distribution business.  
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Next, we construct combinations of specialized firms included in 1-3 groups. Our 
purpose consists of creating hypothetical companies with which we can construct the 
additive technology CS(y,c), which serves as a benchmark for costs where production is 
organized in separate specialized firms. To this end, following Grosskopf and 
Yaisawarng (1990) and Ferrier et al. (1993), we construct all possible permutations of 
specialized firms in one group with each other, which are then added pairwise with the 
permutations of the other group. We form two types of composites according to the 
firms’ group of origin.  
 
(i) Type A composites. They are the result of adding firms of groups 1 and 2. By means 
of the method referred to above, we obtain seven hypothetical companies for each year 
over the period 1991-1997.  These composite observations have costs that are strictly 
additive and are used to construct an additive frontier.  
 
The distinctive feature of these composites is that they are formed from the sum of 
output vectors of specialized firms that are orthogonal to one another9. Further, this 
makes them suitable to measure the potential economies of scope between generation 
and distribution, i.e. vertical economies. 
 
(ii) Type B composites. They are formed from additive combinations of specialized 
firms included in groups 2 and 3. We obtain 49 hypothetical firms for each year, which 
gives a total of 343 composites. The characteristic of these composites is that the 
aggregation of specialized firms would result in higher horizontal diversification. 
Unlike type A composites, output vectors of specialized firms are not orthogonal, since 
all these firms distribute power. The resulting additive frontier is a suitable benchmark 
to measure the potential economies of diversification as defined above. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 To be precise, almost orthogonal, since Endesa’s production of hydroelectric power is not zero, but 
represents about 3.5% of total utility’s generation. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Economies of vertical integration 
 
First, we measure the cost efficiency of diversified firms included in group 4 relative to 
their own technology i.e. we calculate the distance Ed(yd,cd) by solving problem [7]. We 
construct the frontier using the whole sample of diversified firms as the reference 
production set. That is, we merge the data for all the years 1991-1997 into one set to 
construct an intertemporal frontier (Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995).  
Next, we do the same thing with type A composites (49 units) and measure the cost 
efficiency of diversified firms relative to this additive frontier. That is, we compute the 
distance EAS(yd,cd) by solving problem [8]. The degree of scope economies for each 
diversified firm is given by  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) 1,
,
,
,, −=⋅
⋅−⋅=
d
k
d
k
d
d
k
d
k
s
A
d
k
d
k
d
k
d
d
k
d
k
d
k
dd
k
d
k
d
k
s
Ad
k cyE
cyE
ccyE
ccyEccyE
ySC  
 
which is equivalent to [2].  
 
Results are shown in Table 2. SC(yk) >0 for every diversified firm, that is, the partition 
of the output vector (yH, yT, yD) into (0, yT, 0) and (yH, 0, yD)  would result in efficiency 
losses due to the loss of scope economies, where yH, yT and yD stand form hydro 
generation, thermal generation and power distribution respectively. Table 2 also reveals 
wide differences between firms. Thus, the output bundle of Unión Fenosa presents the 
highest degree of scope economies (21.1%), while figures for the other firms range from 
2.1%-8%.  
 
Additionally, we have calculated the impact that such a fragmentation of the five 
diversified firms would have on the total operation costs of the Spanish electricity 
sector. Column 1 in Table 3 shows that this alternative would be, on average, 4.7% 
more expensive than keeping the diversified firms with their actual output bundles. 
 
[Tables 2 and 3] 
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5.2 Economies of horizontal diversification 
 
To estimate the diversification economies in the generation stage we compare Ed(yd,cd) 
with EBS(yd,cd). Subscript B indicates that the additive frontier is constructed with type B 
composites. We compute the degree of economies of diversification for each of our 
diversified firms according to [3] as  
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As shown in Table 2, with the exception of HidroCantábrico, economies of horizontal 
diversification are less significant for utilities than scope economies. Further, one utility 
(Viesgo) does not enjoy economies of diversification while Fecsa’s are very modest 
(0.5%). As Table 3 shows, such a partition for each of the five diversified utilities 
would increase 3.5% total operating costs of the electricity sector. 
 
5.3 Scale economies 
 
As shown before, any partition of diversified firms that implies the reduction of their 
vertical and/or horizontal integration would inevitably lead to a cost increase. Hence, 
one may ask whether it is efficient to divide the existing firms in smaller companies 
while keeping constant their current degree of vertical integration and horizontal 
diversification. This requires checking if the increase of the number of competitors is 
not counterweighted by the efficiency losses due to the reduction of the firms’ scale of 
operations.  To that purpose, we divide down the middle the output bundles of the five 
diversified firms. Such a partition keeps constant their output proportions, and 
consequently, their degree of horizontal and vertical integration.  
 
A firm operating at optimal scale is scale efficient and any deviation from the point of 
scale efficiency raises average costs above the minimum. Scale efficiency is computed 
as the distance to the optimal scale size. In Figure 1, the tangent to the total cost curve is 
the ray OT, which measures the optimal production scale at output yo. Only yo is scale 
efficient while the vertical distance OC/OV measures the scale inefficiency for yo/2, 
which is the ratio of total costs and costs on the OT ray at the output level yo/2. Points 
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on the OT ray are feasible when constant returns to scale prevail. Hence, scale 
efficiency is computed as the ratio between the distance to the cost frontier under 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and the distance to the cost frontier under variable 
returns to scale (VRS). 
 
Let εd denote the scale efficiency corresponding to the original output of diversified 
firms while εd/2 that corresponding to the halved firms, then 
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Ray average cost is decreasing, increasing or constant if εd /εd/2 is lower than, greater 
than of equal to unity respectively.10 The degree of multiproduct scale economies for 
each firm is computed as  
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Results for RSE (y) are shown in last three columns of Table 2. It is clear that 
fragmentation of firms would produce cost savings due to the improvement of scale 
efficiency. Thus, the break-up of each diversified firm into two identical units (holding 
constant its original output proportions) would improve scale efficiency of three out of 
five firms, while for the other two the impact would be negligible (0.1%) The overall 
annual cost savings for the electricity sector would represent 2.7% on average, as shown 
in Table 3. These result is consistent with earlier studies showing that economies of 
scale are exhausted for relatively small sizes, both at plant and firm level (see Ramos-
Real, 2005 for a comprehensive review). 
 
 
                                                          
10 Efficiency under constant returns to scale is computed by deleting the restriction 1
1
=∑
=
K
k
kz  to the linear 
problem [8]. See Cooper et al (2000) for further details. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper has estimated the degree of economies of scope, horizontal diversification 
and scale in the Spanish electricity sector by means of Data Envelopment Analysis. Our 
results may be summarized as follows: (i) We find scope economies between generation 
and distribution for every diversified utility in a range of 2.1% to 21.1%. Complete 
vertical unbundling would have raised operating costs of the sector about 4.7 percent 
over the period 1991-1997; (ii) Cost savings due to the diversification of power 
generation accounted up to 17.5% for the average firm over 1991-1997. Thus, the 
eventual horizontal specialization at the generation stage would have risen the operating 
costs of the period by 3.5%; (iii) Economies of scale are not important provided that 
vertical scope and product-mix are preserved. On average, overall operating costs of the 
sector could be reduced by 2.7% by dividing each of the diversified firms down the 
middle. 
 
These results have important policy implications for the restructuring of the electric 
power sector. Thus, any break-up of firms implying complete vertical disintegration 
and/or firm’s specialization on the generation stage is expensive options in terms of 
efficiency losses. Therefore, the expected competitive gains of such partition should be 
compared with the sacrifice of vertical and horizontal economies. 
 
By contrast, a partition of large diversified firms would be rational on the grounds of 
economic efficiency provided that vertical and horizontal output proportions are 
preserved. In addition to the likely benefits from higher competition, the combined cost 
of the constituent smaller firms would be lower than the cost of the larger firms because 
of the improvement in their scale efficiency. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of outputs and cost by electric utility 
 COST 
(thousand €) 
HYDRO  
(GWh) 
%  THERM 
(GWh) 
%  LV 
(GWh) 
%  HV 
(GWh) 
%  CUSTOM VI ratio *  
(%) 
Hidro. Cantábrico 288263 720 9 7002 91 1288 21 4748 79 444809 128 
Unión Fenosa 921183 3559 18 16300 82 8584 41 12351 59 2340727 95 
Iberdrola 1750724 13188 30 30982 70 27790 63 2647 49 7991148 81 
Endesa 1289465 1486 4 37626 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sevillana 585596 1039 8 11149 92 9242 48 10195 52 3368529 63 
Fecsa 414163 2036 18 9322 82 7825 53 6908 47 1828987 77 
ERZ 88223 697 100 0 0 2046 47 2321 53 634754 16 
ENHER 330989 2618 87 400 13 4501 46 5236 54 924965 31 
GESA 132595 0 0 3090 100 2145 81 489 19 496757 117 
UNELCO 288919 0 0 4250 100 2663 68 1260 32 727823 108 
VIESGO 101253 831 32 1730 68 1229 38 2003 62 447002 79 
HEC 96246 613 100 0 0 2311 61 1487 39 538498 16 
Average diversified firm 695119 4067 24 13067 76 9343 47 10495 53 2610535 86 
 
 
Note: Average values 1991-1997 
* Vertical Integration ratio = (HYDRO + THERM) / (HV + LV)
 23 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Degree of economies of scope, diversification and scale by electric utility (mean values 1991-1997). 
 Vertical economies Diversification economies Scale economies 
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d
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S
B cyE )(
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kyDIV  εd ε d/2 )( dkyRSE  
FECSA 0.957 1.003 0.049 0.957 0.962 0.005 0.999 1.000 -0.001 
HIDRO. CANTÁBRICO 0.883 0.935 0.059 0.883 0.940 0.065 0.947 0.985 -0.039 
IBERDROLA 0.912 0.990 0.080 0.912 0.955 0.045 0.941 1.000 -0.059 
UNIÓN FENOSA 0.816 0.986 0.211 0.816 0.983 0.207 0.857 0.943 -0.092 
VIESGO 0.946 0.966 0.021 0.946 0.947 0.000 0.991 0.992 -0.001 
Average diversified firm 0.826 1.026 0.240 0.826 0.971 0.175 0.969 0.993 -0.024 
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Table 3. The impact of alternative partitions on the operating costs 
of the Spanish electricity sector (percentage on total costs). 
 )(
d
kySC  )(
d
kyDIV  )(
d
kyRSE  
1991 7.3 6.6 -1.3 
1992 3.4 3.6 -5.9 
1993 3.4 2.6 -4.5 
1994 3.5 3.1 -0.7 
1995 4.7 3.9 -4.5 
1996 7.6 4.1 -0.4 
1997 2.8 1.2 -2.3 
Mean 4.7 3.5 -2.7 
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